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In Kelber’s hermeneutics of John, the notion of the pre-existence Logos is central. The 
Logos, in his reading, is prior to the realm of history and outside the reality of the narrative 
text. I have argued that the Logos in John can be seen as a leading case of logocentrism as 
coined by Derrida. The term ‘logocentrism’ refers to the Graeco-Christian or Johannine 
Platonic tradition according to which written language belongs to the realm of the imperfect 
whereas true knowledge pertains to the pre-existent, personified Logos. Derrida provides an 
uncompromising critique of logocentrism. He read Western theology and philosophy not in 
terms of a fading logocentrism and a rise of textcentrism, but rather in terms of the illusion 
of logocentrism. Derrida’s principle of distress is the referential paradigm of language. The 
linguistic sign is defined by the signifier and the signified. The signifier constitutes the visible 
marks committed to paper and the signified is the so-called meaning we attached to them. 
For Derrida, written language is generally seen as inferior whereas spoken language takes 
on transcendental significance and an ontological status to the referent of language. The 
Western tradition of philosophy and theology views writing as exterior whereas speech 
appears as innocent. Derrida’s logocentrism approach challenges the privileging of speech 
over writing in the referential system, accusing Western theology and philosophy of falsely 
enslaving the sign by establishing a transcendental signifier over against writing. In this 
article, these ideas of Derrida are applied by reading the Logos in the Johannine narrative from 
the perspective of orality and textuality.
Introduction
In John’s Gospel, there is a shift from the charismatic speech (oral formula of the Logos) to the 
narrative text, where the status of Logos at the beginning of John 1v1 becomes the determiner 
of the logoi (words) in the Johannine narrative. Central to the oral and written hermeneutics of 
John’s Gospel lies the idea of the pre-existent Logos. Being with Jesus metaphysically, the Logos is 
situated prior to the realm of history and outside the reality and construction of the written text. 
The written text cannot really be accorded full self-referentiality of the spoken word in the biblical 
text, because of its relation to the Father and the Spirit whose existence goes back to the beginning 
of creation. When viewed in relation to logoi (words in the narrative text), the Logos can be seen as 
normative, but when it is viewed in relation to the spoken Logos as a transcendental signifier, it 
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Derrida se kritiek op logosentrisme teenoor tekssentrisme: ’n Toepassing op Johannes 1v1. 
In Kelber se hermeneutiek van Johannes is die pre-eksistensie van die Logos sentraal. Die 
Logos, volgens sy lesing, gaan vooraf aan die historiese gebied en staan buite die realiteit 
van die narratiewe teks. Ek het geargumenteer dat die Logos by Johannes beskou word as ’n 
eksemplariese geval van logosentrisme, soos Derrida dit omskryf het. Die term ‘logosentrisme’ 
verwys na die Grieks-Christelike of Johanneïese Platonistiese tradisie waarvolgens geskrewe 
taal tot die onvolmaakte hoort, terwyl ware kennis verband hou met die vooraf-bestaande, 
gepersonifieerde Logos. In sy werk bied Derrida ’n ongekompromitteerde kritiek 
op logosentrisme. Hy lees Westerse teologie en filosofie nie in terme van ’n wegvaag van 
logosentrisme en die opkoms van tekssentrisme nie, maar eerder in terme van die illusie van 
logosentrisme. Derrida se noodbeginsel is die verwysingsraamwerk vir taal. Die taalteken word 
omskryf deur die betekenaar en betekende. Die betekenaar konstitueer die sigbare merkies op 
die papier geplaas en die betekende is die sogenaamde betekenis wat ons aan hulle heg. Volgens 
Derrida word geskrewe taal in die algemeen as minderwaardig beskou terwyl gesproke taal 
transendentale betekenis verkry en ’n ontologiese status met betrekking tot die verwysing 
van taal. Die Westerse tradisie in filosofie en teologie sien skrywe as uiterlik terwyl praat as 
onskuldig verskyn. Derrida se logosentriese aanpak val die bevoorregting van praat bo skrywe 
in die verwysingsraamwerk aan en beskuldig Westerse teologie en filosofie dat dit die teken 
valslik verslaaf deur ’n transendentale betekenaar teenoor skrywe te stel. In hierdie artikel is 
bogenoemde idees van Derrida toegepas deur die Logos in die Johanneïese narratief uit die 
oogpunt van oraliteit en tekstualiteit te lees.
Scan this QR 
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to read online.
Read online:
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v79i1.50http://www.koersjournal.org.za
appears in a less prominent position in the written text (Kelber 
1987). The logoi or words in the biblical narrative of John have 
now been subordinated to the metaphysical authority of the 
Logos; this can be seen as only being in transition towards 
what is considered to be real, as it affirms the meaning and 
representation of reality for the ‘other’ in the Johannine 
narrative.
In the Greek, the Logos refers to word, reason, truth, logic and 
law. For Plato, Logos can be seen as a transcendent grounding 
principle of order and reason which gives meaning to 
discourse (Childers 1995:154–155). In the Gospel of John 
the Logos refers to the eternal word, which is equal to the 
metaphysical and ontological status of God. The Logos can 
be seen as a self-sufficient basis or self-identity by which all 
truth can be measured. It serves as a yardstick of all meaning. 
Linguistically, Logos refers to the ‘meaning, presence, idea, 
intention’ that exists behind the written text, whereas the 
spoken word serves as an adequate vehicle of expression 
(Childers 1995:154).
Logos is the meaning to which the sign refers. There is therefore 
a struggle between speech and writing and a domination of 
speech over writing as deconstruction launched an attack 
against the metaphysical construction of the sign. Logos is 
the name and the element of that which makes possible an 
absolutely pure and absolutely self-present self-knowledge. 
The Logos can be infinite and self-present and it can be produced 
as auto-affection only through the voice. An order of the 
signifier by which the subject takes from itself does not borrow 
outside of itself. This is at the consciousness of the voice 
hearing (understanding) oneself speak (Derrida 1976:98).
This article will focus on Jacques Derrida’s critique of 
logocentric hermeneutics that tends to put an end to the 
priority of writing as self-referential. Derrida’s method of 
deconstruction is connected to what he calls ‘metaphysics 
of presence’. He denies this presence in the construction of 
the written text and the social construction of reality. He 
further argues that signs cannot refer to something other 
than themselves. There is no signifier that is independent of 
the signified: we are unable to escape the system of signifiers 
(Sarup 1988:38). Logos serves as a leading case for logocentric 
interpretive interest in the work of Derrida, who exposes the 
hierarchical oppression or the ‘violent rape’ of the spoken 
word in contrast to the written text. This leads me to examine 
Derrida’s critique of logocentrism versus grammatology. 
Derrida’s critique of Logocentrism 
versus Textcentrism
Derrida’s (1976) Of grammatology reads Western philosophy 
and theology not in terms of a fading logocentrism and a rise of 
textcentrism, but rather in terms of the illusion of logocentrism. 
Western philosophy has long been phonocentrically centred 
on the ‘voice’ and deeply suspicious of the script (written text). 
It has been, in the broader sense, logocentric, committed to the 
belief in some ultimate or axiomatic truths, for example: Logos, 
as a transcendental signifier that can be seen as presence, 
truth which acts as a foundation of all thoughts, language 
and experience in Western theology and philosophy (Sarup 
1988:40). Derrida argues that such interpretive interest in 
meaning and representation can be seen as fictional and 
socially created by the West. 
Logocentrism is being obsessed with the ‘Word’, or the big 
explanation of everything. It is the privileging of speech over 
the written word. Logocentrism, one of Derrida’s concepts, 
has been defined as:
the illusion that the meaning of a word has its origin in the structure 
of reality and at the same time makes that truth part of that 
structure seem directly present to the mind. (Ellis 1989:36–37) 
It is a desire to ascribe transcendental significance or 
metaphysics of presence to the signified.
Logocentrism is the privilege of the phōnē, of the ‘system 
of hearing oneself speaking’ through the phonic substance, 
which presents itself as the non-exterior and therefore non-
empirical or non-contingent signifier. It is centred on the idea 
of a full speech that is fully present, an originary speech itself 
shielded from interpretation (Evans 1991:148).
Husserl found evidence for self-presence in the voice (phōnē) 
– not the real voice, but the principle of the voice: 
When I speak I hear myself and understand at the same time 
that I speak. In the act of speaking I seem to coincide with myself 
in a way quite different from what happens when I write. My 
spoken words seem immediately present to my consciousness 
and my voice becomes my intimate spontaneous medium. 
(Sarup 1988:39) 
In our logocentric world, speech is privileged over writing 
because of its sense of proximity to the source of utterance. 
When I speak, the seal between my words and the meaning I 
intend remains intact, secured by my physical presence. For 
Derrida, the Logos as spoken word is the source of the entire 
Western tradition of metaphysics. 
Within this Logos, the essential and original link to phōnē 
has never been broken, and the essence of the phōnē would 
be immediately proximate to that which is thought, as Logos 
relates to meaning, produces it, speaks it, and composes it 
(Evans 1991:148).
Writing, by contrast, seems to drive a wedge between the 
speaker and his or her utterance. It is a secondhand mode of 
communication, a pallid mechanical transcript of speech, and 
so it is always removed from my consciousness. It is for this 
reason that the Western philosophical tradition from Plato to 
Lévi Strauss has consistently vilified writing as a mere lifeless, 
alienated form of expression and consistently celebrated 
the living voice (Sarup 1988:39). This led Derrida to wage a 
one-man ‘deconstructionist’ war against the entire Western 
philosophical and literary tradition of Rationalism or logical 
thought. He goes on to target the Western philosophical and 
theological central assumption of ‘reason’, which seems to be 
dominated by a ‘metaphysics of presence’ or the eternal Logos. 
For Derrida, ’reason’ has been shaped by a dishonest pursuit 
of certainty, which can be seen as ‘Logocentrism and the 
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guarantee of the “Word made Flesh”’ (Appignanesi 1992:76).
The Western history of philosophy, theology and literature, 
from Plato, its founding father, and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, 
right up to Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as well as Saussure, 
can be seen as a constant logocentric quest. Their works have 
contributed to the Western tradition of metaphysics (Moore 
1994:28). In order to support a metaphysics of presence, the 
Western tradition has claimed that there is a supreme principle, 
‘Logos’, that gives meaning to all discourse and organises all 
differences in a system of relationships (Ruf 1989:30).
Derrida criticised the Western tradition that made use of the 
logocentric model in order to absolutise meaning, seeing it 
as a dishonest construction of reality. His major concern is 
with the deviant modes of thought as he shows a persistent 
fascination with Judaism and the problem of its relation to 
Greek and Christian metaphysics. To be more precise, he 
has shown a fascination with writing, especially Judaism, 
and the problem of writing and its relation to ‘Speech’ in 
the Graeco-Christian metaphysics (Moore 1995:120). Derrida 
views the linguistic and theological concept of ‘sign’ as the 
root of logocentrism. 
For Derrida, Western thought has always based itself on 
binary oppositions, for example, transcendent/immanent; 
spirit/flesh; primary/secondary; speech/writing; presence/
absence. In the Gospel of John these binary oppositions or 
two-storied structures seem to be evident, for example, 
knowledge/ignorance (1:10, 26, 31; 3:10–11); spiritual/literal 
(2:19–21; 3:3–4), Spirit/flesh (1:18; 3:16); heavenly things/
earthly things (3:12), light/darkness (3:19–21; 1:7–9), Baptism 
in the Holy Spirit/water baptism (1:31; 3:5); heavenly 
ascent/descent (1:51; 3:13; 3:31). These binary oppositions 
can be seen as oppressive; moreover, the whole purpose of 
deconstructive hermeneutics is to dismantle or destroy such 
oppressive binary thinking, because there is no peaceful 
co-existence but rather violent hierarchy in the binary 
construction of the text (Moore 1995:27–28).
This suspicion is not just evident amongst post-structuralists 
across the academic spectrum, where this oppositionised 
binary thinking has been challenged. For example, this seems 
to be evident in our own context between androcentrism 
and feminism, white and black, the dominant ideology and 
marginalised oppressed communities, whereas there is a 
great need for liberation to take place against such dominant 
ideological structures. One of these logocentric binary 
oppositions to which Derrida directs special attention is that 
of ‘Speech versus Writing’. Orality, as seen in the binary 
model of Saussure, has been treated as a transcendental 
signifier, whereas writing is treated as secondary.
In the following allegory, the history of speech began in a 
garden. They (Adam and Eve) heard the sound of God 
walking in the garden at the time of the evening breeze. The 
man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of God 
(Gn 3:8). The garden is speech, declared the Jewish poet, 
Edmond Jábes. Derrida extends Jábes’s allegory:
God no longer speaks to us; he has interrupted himself: we 
must take words upon ourselves. We must intrust ourselves to 
traces because we have cease[d] hearing the voice from within 
the immediate proximity of the garden. The difference between 
speech and writing is sin, ... lost immediacy, work outside the 
garden. (Moore 1995:29)
Outside the garden (allegory-speech), there is only sand and 
separation (writing). Writing is the moment of the desert or 
the moment of separation. Writing defaces presence. The 
relationship between speech and writing, Logos and the Book, 
is also an issue for Christianity, according to Ong (1982):
In Christian teaching orality and literacy polarities are particularly 
acute, probably more acute than in any religious tradition, even 
the Hebrew. For the Christian teaching the Second Person (Logos) 
of the One Godhead, who redeemed mankind from their sin, is 
known not only as the Son (Berâ) but also as the Word of God. 
In this teaching God the Father (Abbâ) utters or speaks his Word 
(Logos), his Son. He does not inscribe him. The very person of the 
Son (Berâ) is constituted as the Word (Logos) of the Father (Abbâ). 
Yet Christian teaching also presents at its core the written word 
of God, the Bible, which, back of its human authors, has God as 
[A]uthor as no other writing does. (p. 179)
Although Derrida has written about the Bible (the Book) 
on occasion, he has never directly tackled the relationship 
of speech versus writing (orality and literacy binary) in the 
Jewish or Christian tradition. Within Aristotle’s construction 
of meaning, speech and writing is the progress we have come 
to refer to as ‘signification’. The spoken words are the symbols 
of mental experience (pathēmatatēs psychēs), whereas written 
words are the symbols of spoken words. This is because the 
voice, the producer of the first symbol, has a relationship 
immediately with the mind (Derrida 1976:11). He groups 
the three phenomena of thought, speech and writing into an 
essential duality.
Thought is symbolised by spoken words, which in return is 
symbolised by written words. Orality (speech) can be seen as 
innocence, whereas writing has fallen from that innocence. 
The pure originality of oral verbalisation is disrupted by 
writing. Writing seems to force itself on the natural condition 
of the Logos, even violating and raping it (Derrida 1976:29). 
Throughout Western history, speech has always been idealised 
at the expense of writing. This is clearly illustrated in the 
second Epistle of John as John writes to the ‘elect lady’: ‘I 
would rather not use paper and ink, instead I hope to come to 
you face to face so that our joy may be completed (2 Jn 2)’. 
When I speak, my words seem to be one with my thoughts. 
Meaning is present both to the hearer and to the speaker. 
What can be clearly observed is that speech creates presence 
but also authentic representation of meaning. Derrida (1973) 
in Speech and phenomena, says: 
My words are alive, because they seem not to leave me: not to fall 
outside me, outside my breath, at a visible distance; not to cease 
to belong to me. (p. 76)
This is evident in the theological and philosophical names 
designated in the Western tradition, for example, God, truth 
and being, were endowed with a special sense of ‘metaphysics 
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of presence’. For Derrida, the Western thought of orality was 
a paradigm not just for every form of presence but for every 
form of truth. This can be seen as problematic as it becomes 
the centre and guarantor of presence (Moore 1994:28). This 
desire for centre or presence (onto-beingness) Derrida calls 
’logocentrism’. Logocentrism refers to the Graeco-Christian 
or Platonic Johannine tradition according to which language 
– above all, written language – belongs to the realm of the 
contingent or metaphysical world (Kelber 1987:120).
The concept Logos in the Gospel of John carries the greatest 
meaning of ‘presence’. The Logos is the origin of all things. 
The ’word’ underwrites full presence, because everything 
is the effect of this one cause (Selden 1985:85). Even though 
the Bible is written, God’s word is essentially spoken. The 
spoken word, filled with life, creates an intimate sense of 
presence. Logocentrism desires a perfect rational language 
that perfectly represents the real world. Such a language 
of reason would guarantee that the ’presence’ of the world 
and the essence of everything in the world would be 
transparently (re)present(ed) in order to secure complete 
certainty (Appignanesi 1992:78). Words would be literally 
the truth of all things. John in the Fourth Gospel puts it that 
the ‘Word became flesh’ and so:
The binary opposition between speech and writing can thus be 
seen as a sin and oppressive, because it defaces every theology 
of presence. The written marks seems lifeless in the midst of 
living speech, cut off from the pneuma, the Spirit, breath (rūach). 
(Moore 1995:30)
Writing remains a threat to truth and a distortion of 
presence. The opposition of speech and writing can be seen 
as oppressive, where speech, being superior, belongs to the 
Logos (world of metaphysics) and a higher presence. Writing, 
the inferior term, marks a fall as it is seen as death.
In Socrates’s account of the Egyptian story of writing there 
are two figures in the myth, Theuth, the inventor of writing, 
and Thamus, the king-god of all Egypt. Theuth presented his 
interventions to King Thamus, saying that his arts (technai) 
ought to be passed to the king’s people. In Socrates’s account, 
Theuth claims that letters will make the Egyptians wiser and 
improve their memories. He claims to have discovered an 
elixir (pharmakon: potion, remedy, medicine) for memory 
(mneme) and wisdom (sophia) (Irvine 1994:26). The king’s 
response should be considered in full:
O man full of art, one man is given the power to create things 
of arts, and to judge the harm or usefulness to those who shall 
use them. And now you, who are the father of letters (pater 
grammaton), I have been led by your affection to ascribe to them 
a power opposite to that which they in fact possess. For this 
intervention will produce forgetfulness (lethe) in the minds of 
those who learn to use it; they will not exercise memory because 
they trust in writing, bringing things to remembrance not 
from within themselves. You have discovered an elixir not for 
memory (mneme) but for reminding (hypomneseos). You offer 
your students the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom. For 
they will hear many things, while for the most part they are 
ignorant, and as men filled not with wisdom but with conceit of 
wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows. (Irvine 1994:27)
In this version of the myth of the origins of writing, those who 
practised the art of letters depended on writing externally 
represented: an activity that suppresses remembrance, 
something within the soul, an art of words (logoi) applied like 
medicine to the soul for the benefit of health.
For Plato, writing displays a double sense of pharmakon – 
medicine and poison. Writing anything put in grammata is 
not a medicine or pharmakon, but a poison to the soul. Writing 
is not clear and certain. Written words are of no use except 
as a reminder of that which they are written about (Irvine 
1994:27). For Socrates, writing resembles a son–and-father 
relationship. For Socrates, words must have fathers. He 
claims that the relationship between spoken words and their 
fathers is more direct, more immediate, than the miserable 
relationship between the written text and their authors. 
Writing is like an orphan, and his father (of Logos) is nowhere 
to be found (Brogan 1989:1–24). Socrates views writing as 
dead and speech as living. This is clearly reflected in the 
following saying by him:
Once a thing is put into writing, the composition drifts all 
over the place, getting into the hands of not only those who 
understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it, 
it does not know how to address the right people and not address 
the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and fairly abused it always 
needs parents to come to its help. An orphan and a delinquent, 
no sooner born than set adrift, cut loose from the author who 
gave birth to it. Writing seems fated endlessly to circulate, if not 
from foster home to foster home, then from reader to reader, the 
best of whom can never be sure that he or she has fully what the 
author intended to say. (Moore 1994:30)
For Socrates, writing is like a painting, which generates a 
non-living being, which in return keeps silent when asked 
to answer. The written text is non-self-interpreting. Nothing 
is clear when left to writing. Besides this sterile sameness, 
writing is indifferent to its addressees. Writing wandering 
here and there is heedless of whom it reaches, and if disputes 
arise, or if it is unjustly despised, it still needs the help of 
the father. By themselves, written texts are unable to rescue 
themselves (Valdes 1991:333). For Socrates (Irvine 1994:27), 
writing can therefore be called an illegitimate child, a bastard 
brother, because it is silent to speak for itself when questioned. 
Socrates reflects this strongly in the following quotation:
What He does not say, but what is nevertheless true, is that 
the written word at its best fails to convey an illusion of the 
spontaneity of the spoken Logos, but with perfection of form as 
the premeditated speech seldom achieves, and conversely the 
spoken word, in the age of writing, aims at the considered structure 
of the written word, but without abandoning its own sense of 
immediacy and responsiveness to social use. (Greene 1951:152)
Though writing is supposed to help the memory, it actually 
leads to more forgetfulness, because it relies on the written 
characters rather than on memory. Moreover, the written 
word is not really intelligible or certain, nor is it better than 
knowledge; but it is a recollection of its subject-matter. 
Writing cannot answer questions, but can give unvarying 
answers. Better is the Logos written in the soul of the learner, 
that can defend itself, and that knows when to speak and 
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when to be silent. What can be observed is that the presence 
of the author seems to be absent and even ‘dead’ as described 
by Roland Barthes, and that the meaning of the written text 
cannot be defended. It is not just the [A]uthor who is ‘dead’ 
but also the property of writing. The main difference between 
the oral and the written word is the context. The speaker of an 
oral language relies more on context and non-verbal cues for 
communicating the verbal message (Greenfield 1972:169).
In primarily oral cultures, the word is closely related to 
power and action. It is dynamic, not static, and includes the 
sense that, once spoken, it is gone without the possibility 
of re-presentation. An oral representation is therefore an 
unrepeatable event in time, unlike written text, which is 
repeatedly read and referred to. Further, in primarily oral 
cultures, recitation of words to sound determines not only 
two modes of expression but also thought processes. You 
know what you recall (Ong 1982:33).
Derrida’s critique of the false 
consciousness construction of the 
metaphysics of presence
Derrida’s rejection of the logocentric model of the West is 
largely based on the fusion of Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s 
critiques of Western metaphysics. Derrida refuses to accept 
that there is a transcendental signifier that gives meaning 
to all of history and truth. Meaning is not an illusionary 
constructed reality where the signifier and the signified are 
fused to create a ‘sign’ (semeion). For Derrida, the meaning 
of the sign comes from another sign and not from outside 
the realm of objectivity. He opposes the idea that there is 
something like literal or true meaning or absolute meaning 
in the understanding of the social construction of reality 
(Leitch 1988:277–282).
The rejection of any literal or true meaning shifts the 
interpretation from the transcendental signifier to the reader, 
who needs to interpret the text. Meaning is reduced to the 
self and there can be many legitimate understandings of the 
written text or different perspectives. Meaning is never full 
‘presence’ in a sign system but always a substitute (Norris 
1982:32).
Derrida’s argument is that no meaning can be finalised in a 
‘speech act’, because it is in the nature of a text that writing 
can be cited:
Every sign, linguistic or non linguistic, spoken or written, as 
small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; 
thereby it can break with every given context, and engender 
infinitely new contexts in an absolutely non saturable fashion. 
(Easthrope 1988:167)
For Derrida, there is no ‘single’ meaning that can saturate 
the text, because the text can always be interpreted beyond 
its original context. The written sign is a mark that can 
be repeated in the absence not only of the subject who is 
uttered in a specific context but also of a specific addressee. 
The written sign is not bound to a specific context, but it 
breaks its real context and can be read in a different context 
regardless of what the author’s intention is or its social, 
historical sitz im leben [position in life] is. The written sign 
is subject to spacing, because it is separated from other 
signs in the particular chain of differences; furthermore, it is 
separated from ‘present reference’ (that is, it can refer only to 
something not present) (Selden 1985:88). Writing involves a 
certain irresponsibility, because if signs are repeatable out of 
context, then ‘What authority does it possess in the light of 
meaning and representation?’ 
Derrida agreed that some interpretations are more powerful 
than others, because meaning is determined by a system of 
forces that is not personal. It does not depend on the subjective 
identity, but on the field of different forces, the conflict of 
forces that produce interpretations (Easthrope 1988:168). 
Meaning is a product of the interplay of differences. There 
are no final meanings to the signification process. This means 
that the signifier is not subordinated to the signified. For 
Derrida, the absence of the transcendental signified extends 
the realm and the play of signification to infinity (Degenaar 
1992:201). For Culler (1982:123), meaning is context bound, 
but the context is boundless. The context itself is a text 
that must be interpreted. Meaning can be interpreted as a 
product of a play of differences in a text within a context. 
Both context and text must always be defined, delimited, 
read, and interpreted.
The written text has been described in various ways, 
depending on the paradigm used by the speaker. The written 
text is seen as a document producing information in the mind 
of the writer and his or her view of life. The written text can 
be seen as a monument with its own autonomy, [a] timeless, 
self-possessed structure of meaning. (Degenaar 1992:200)
A written text is a happening in which signs and the traces 
of signs make themselves available to the reader for the 
adventure of understanding. The text is an episode in the 
all-encompassing textuality. For Derrida, there is nothing 
outside the written text or there is nothing outside of context 
(Degenaar 1992:200).
Derrida refuses to accept that there is something like ‘oral 
text’, because this leads to the Structuralists and Form critics 
who want to imprison the oral formulae of the Logos and 
reduce it to writing (Fuchs 1994:401). He further argues that 
meaning must be free from the prison house of the Western 
tradition that has enslaved the written text with a dishonest 
metaphysics of presence. This violent hierarchy between 
speech and writing as constructed by the structuralists 
is an economy of power. This economy of power exists 
amongst the literate, who violently want to secure meaning 
over speech by drawing on the assumption that there are 
structured forms in the written text (Ruf 1989:31). 
This remains a question of debate because with structured 
forms come boundaries and social maintenance of the 
written text. Immediately, an axiomatic expression can be 
seen as a false identity of the written text. Derrida insists that 
the oppressive hierarchy between speech and writing must 
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be destabilised and even collapsed in order to free meaning 
from these oppressive hierarchical structures. The premise for 
meaning is built on a false identity that is constructed on the 
metaphysics of presence. The whole purpose of the ideology 
of representation is to privilege speech over writing, and 
to establish a regime of power and a disciplinary exclusion 
(Fuchs 1994:401).
The question that rests with the reader is, ‘How do you 
overthrow this oppressive hierarchy between logocentrism 
as opposed to textcentrism?’ Derrida proposes that the 
reader needs to point out its arbitrary status, and then has to 
cancel out ‘truth’ or ’Logos’ and its will to power, because the 
dominant discourse or the Western tradition has established 
oppressive viewpoints. When interpreting oral signs, the 
reader has to recognise certain fixed and identical forms in 
the written text and whatever accent or distortion may be 
involved in the utterance of the word. It calls on the reader 
to exclude the accidental ’phonic’ sound and then to recover 
the pure form. This form is the repeatable signifier thought 
characteristic of writing (Selden 1985:88). What can be 
observed is that speech is a product of writing. 
Derrida’s re-situation of the ‘self’ at the margins relates directly 
to the notion of ’intertextuality’, where the reader is a ‘text’, 
one of many ’texts’ involved in the act of reading. His concept 
of ‘text’ is not synonymous with ‘book or scriptism’.
A text is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, 
some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a 
differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to 
something other than itself, to other differential traces (Long 
1992:50–64).
For many, the concept of the ‘text’ in the work of Derrida 
has created a great amount of confusion. Writing for Derrida 
is ‘free play’ or the element of undesirability within every 
system. Derrida’s ‘endless play’ grows out of an encounter 
with another text, for example, text from Plato, Rousseau and 
the work of Saussure (Bryant 1989:73).
In speech, the signifier (voice) and the signified (meaning) are 
given together. Form and meaning are immediately perceived. 
Voice, intonation, gesture, and the other communicative 
devices used by both speaker and receiver help to clarify 
the meaning of the message. Writing is different because 
the signifier is in the form of words that have many possible 
forms of meaning once they are separated from the person 
who wrote them. Therefore, the signified (the meaning) is 
not given: it must be interpreted by the reader. This is what 
Derrida calls ‘free play’ of words that can never be ‘pinned 
down’ to a meaning (Bryant 1989:73, 75). Words are simply 
floating with no meaning attached to them; there is no 
common meaning to be found. 
Derrida takes this notion of ‘free play’ a step further as he 
expands it beyond the binary debate of speech and writing 
and begins to question the whole concept of structure or 
centre of the written text. There is:
[no] absolute meaning outside and above the world of discourse 
that gives significance to the whole interpretive interest, there is 
no centre to define and guide interpretation. Rather, there is free 
play between the signifier and the signified, i.e. the message 
takes on a different meaning depending on who is receiving or 
reading it. (Bryant 1989:73–75)
To Derrida, the concept of a centre (Logos) to a structure is 
non-existent. Writing remains an endless displacement of 
meaning that places language beyond the reach of any stable 
or self-authenticating knowledge. For Derrida, oral language 
belongs to a generalised writing that is ever disguised by the 
illusion of the metaphysics of presence (Norris 1982:29–32). 
The craving of writing for a self-presence and a self-identity 
is withheld by phonocentrism, which views speech as 
privileged over writing. This leads to a rejection of the 
logocentric model of the West. Derrida rejects all forms of 
logocentrism, as he claims it is a form of onto-theology that 
denies the social, historical, finite and contingent character of 
human thought. Logocentrism fails to see that meaning is 
tied to human beings, which is a changing system of relations. 
Logocentrism is an onto-theological attempt to evade the 
recognition of human finitude that is able to give meaning to 
the written text as it undermines the philosophy of idealism 
and Western humanism (Ruf 1989:320).
In the philosophy of Descartes, whose premise was built on 
methodological doubt of the written text, he came to realise 
that one cannot doubt oneself in relation to the meaning of 
text. This is clearly stated in the following words, ’Cogito, ergo 
sum’ [I think, therefore I am]. The ‘I’ becomes the determiner 
of the written text. What is evident in the hermeneutics of 
Derrida is a paradigmatic shift from the Western tradition 
whose underlying basis for meaning is deeply rooted in 
the metaphysics of presence to the ‘I’ or self-identity that 
determines the meaning of discourse.
Martin Buber, the Jewish philosopher, put this into closer 
perspective, in view of the ‘I and Thou’ theory, which 
reveals a relationship between Logos and human beings (the 
metaphysics of presence and homo sapiens) and gives meaning 
to the ‘I’ and its reality and the meaning of the written text and 
context. He became less interested in perceiving the mind or 
life experience of the author behind the written text. He is 
more concerned with the integrity of the text, in developing a 
dialogical relationship with the text, and a dialogue between 
the speaker and the context (Kepnes 1988:193–213).
According to Coleridge (see Perkins 1994), the primary word 
I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being (personhood) 
and all language and meaning is fundamentally rooted in 
the divine Logos. Every word that proceeds from a person’s 
mouth in whom ‘will and reason’ are united is in itself 
analogous as a symbol of the divine Logos (ibid:271).
For Froman (1991), Gadamer is the one that ‘presents the 
hermeneutical problem in all its purity’ because writing 
is a kind of alienated speech. Self-alienation takes place 
when meaning is written down, that is to say ‘inscripted’. 
The written signs per se are incapable of yielding any meaning, 
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v79i1.50http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 7 of 8
unless they are transformed back into speech and meaning. 
The weakness of writing is the lack of support for the written 
inscription from the circumstances of its inscription (Froman 
1991:139). The sign language refers back to the actual language 
of speech. For Gadamer, writing needs to be extended to 
aesthetics, the whole sphere of art and its complex questions. 
He later notes that the meaning of the text extends also to oral 
utterances (interface between oral and written orality) and 
that Schleiermacher first discerned this truth at the turn of 
the 19th century (Gadamer 1985:353).
Derrida rejects the perspective of Western meaning and 
representation as he views the whole constructed reality of 
meaning as an illusion. The ‘I and it’ gives meaning to the 
written text. The ‘I’ refers to the self-identity, and the ‘it’ 
refers to the written text, for the ‘I’ determines the meaning 
of the written text. Linguistically, the ‘I’ referred to ‘floaters’ 
(it means whoever says it). The ‘I’ is not attached to a 
designatable object or a person but it refers to the individual’s 
own personal world or awareness (Ong 1995:22).
The undecidability of writing is not a matter of the bare 
play of signifiers, but rather an undecidability of  writing 
as decentring. Derrida’s attack is against the constant danger 
of attributing ‘presence’ and meaning to the Logos. His attack 
is not against the human need to seek truth, nor does he 
deny that truth can be found; his major argument against 
logocentrism is that truth cannot be found in the ‘metaphysics 
of presence’ or logocentrism because that is no truth. It falls 
outside the realm of scientific objectivity. What we claim to 
be truth can be seen as a questionable phenomenon. 
The whole objective of deconstructionist hermeneutics is 
to adhere to these marginalised voices and to empower the 
reader to decide on the meaning of a written text. For Derrida, 
the written text can no longer be compared to an extra-mental 
or external social or primordial reality such as Logos. The written 
text remains a social construct of the West in the production 
of knowledge, because beyond the written text are only traces 
of more written text. The sign points to other signs and it no 
longer refers to an independent reality outside of the world 
(kosmos), because there is nothing outside of written text – in 
other words, there is nothing outside of context.
Writing distances the word from the plenum of existence. 
In the spoken condition, words are always part of context 
that is predominantly non-verbal. The immediate context of 
spoken words is never simply other words. Context always 
controls the meaning of a word (Ong 1988:39). In primary 
oral communities the source (speaker) and the recipient 
(hearer) are present to one another in order to affirm meaning 
and representation. For words are sounds, and sounds are 
events. Words modify the holistic situation and in one way 
or another they explain and interpret it:
It is in orality that the verbal expression has its origin. The oral 
Word is essentially a call, a cry. It is not a thing or a reification, 
but an event, an action. The oral word is a call from someone to 
someone, an interpersonal transaction. No interactive persons, 
no words. The oral word in meaning and representation is a 
unique kind of event, to whom the word is addressed, called 
out, cried out (…) the oral word is a call, a cry, addressed to 
another person. The oral word is essentially explanation or 
interpretation, a clarification by one person of something to his or 
her interlocutor. (Ong 1988:259–269)
There is no centre from which one can finalise meaning, as 
the trained reader becomes creatively involved in the play 
of significations. Meaning cannot be finalised by linking the 
written text to the writer’s intention (structuralism, historical 
critical method) as a source of meaning. Interpretation is not 
to recover some meaning that lies behind the written text, 
but to participate in a play of possible meanings.
Conclusion
It may be argued that Derrida, who opposes the Western 
tradition of ‘metaphysics of presence’ that is rooted in the 
eternal concept of Logos or metaphysics of presence, agrees 
that it is impossible to overthrow it, because it existed at 
the beginning of creation (Jn 1v1) or outside the realm of 
scientific objectivity. Hermeneutically, deconstruction is 
viewed by some textual critics in the Husserlian tradition 
as a new paradigm that can resolve and even destroy the 
basic structures of logocentric interpretative interest in 
Western thought. As much as Derrida wants to change the 
oppressive binary oppositions between speech and writing, 
deconstruction continues to affirm the ideology of the 
written text in relation to the power of speech or metaphysics 
of presence. Binary oppositions represent a way of seeing 
ideologies and power relationships in the text through ideas 
and conceptual frameworks. 
In the context of the Johannine Logos (transcendental signifier) 
readers and hearers let themselves be guided by the 
narrative dynamic to move from plural experience of the 
logoi (words) to that of the singular Logos which now takes 
command over the narrative text. The written text was 
therefore not considered with ultimate seriousness. The Logos 
does not represent an extra-linguistic mode of authority but 
an extratextual one (Kelber 1987:128). Logos can therefore 
be seen as an appropriate metaphor for transcendence or 
the metaphysics of presence. Like oral speech, the Logos is 
ephemeral. It has no visual or physical means of preservation 
and it manifests itself in a moment of verbal action. Its prime 
potency is sound, which is a strong characteristic of divinity 
and Spirit.
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